The Routledge Handbook of Dehumanization Comments

The Routledge Handbook of Dehumanization Comments

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THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF DEHUMANIZATION A striking feature of atrocities, as seen in genocides, civil wars, or violence against certain racial and ethnic groups, is the attempt to dehumanize — to deny and strip human beings of their humanity. Yet the very nature of dehumanization remains relatively poorly understood. The Routledge Handbook of Dehumanization is the first comprehensive and multidisciplinary ref­ erence source on the subject and an outstanding survey of the key concepts, issues, and debates within dehumanization studies. Organized into four parts, the Handbook covers the following topics: • The history of dehumanization from Greek Antiquity to the 20th century, contextualizing the oscillating boundaries, dimensions, and hierarchies of humanity in the history of the ‘West’; • How dehumanization is contemporarily studied with respect to special contexts: as part of social psychology, as part of legal studies or literary studies, and how it connects to the idea of human rights, disability and eugenics, the question of animals, and the issue of moral standing; • How to tackle its complex facets, with respect to the perpetrator’s and the target’s perspective, metadehumanization and selfdehumanization, rehumanization, social death, status and inter­ dependence, as well as the fear we show toward robots that become too human for us; • Conceptual and epistemological questions on how to distinguish different forms of dehu­ manization and neighboring phenomena, on why dehumanization appears so paradoxical, and on its connection to hatred, essentialism, and perception. Essential reading for students and researchers in philosophy, history, psychology, and anthro­ pology, this Handbook will also be of interest to those in related disciplines, such as politics, international relations, criminology, legal studies, literary studies, gender studies, disability studies, or race and ethnic studies, as well as readers from social work, political activism, and public policy. Maria Kronfeldner is Professor of Philosophy at Central European University (New York Vienna – Budapest). She is the author of What’s Left of Human Nature (2018), and Darwinian Creativity and Memetics (Routledge, 2011). She currently directs ‘The Epistemology of the In/ Human’ project. BK-TandF-KRONFELDNER_9781138588158-200119-FM.indd 1 18/12/20 12:01 PM Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy are state-of-the-art surveys of emerging, newly refreshed, and important fields in philosophy, providing accessible yet thorough assessments of key problems, themes, thinkers, and recent developments in research. All chapters for each volume are specially commissioned, and written by leading scholars in the field. Carefully edited and organized, Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy provide indispens­ able reference tools for students and researchers seeking a comprehensive overview of new and exciting topics in philosophy. They are also valuable teaching resources as accompaniments to textbooks, anthologies, and research-orientated publications. Also available: The Routledge Handbook of Metametaphysics Edited by Ricki Bliss and JTM Miller The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Skill and Expertise Edited by Ellen Fridland and Carlotta Pavese The Routledge Handbook of Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy Edited by Daniele De Santis, Burt Hopkins and Claudio Majolino The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy and Science of Punishment Edited by Farah Focquaert, Elizabeth Shaw, and Bruce N.Waller The Routledge Handbook of Phenomenology of Agency Edited by Christopher Erhard and Tobias Keiling The Routledge Handbook of Feminist Philosophy of Science Edited by Sharon Crasnow and Kristen Intemann The Routledge Handbook of Linguistic Reference Edited by Stephen Biggs and Heimir Geirsson The Routledge Handbook of Dehumanization Edited by Maria Kronfeldner The Routledge Handbook of Anarchy and Anarchist Thought Edited by Gary Chartier and Chad Van Schoelandt For more information about this series, please visit: https://www.routledge.com/ Routledge-Handbooks-in-Philosophy/book-series/RHP BK-TandF-KRONFELDNER_9781138588158-200119-FM.indd 2 18/12/20 12:01 PM THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF DEHUMANIZATION Edited by Maria Kronfeldner BK-TandF-KRONFELDNER_9781138588158-200119-FM.indd 3 18/12/20 12:01 PM First published 2021 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park,Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2021 selection and editorial matter, Maria Kronfeldner; individual chapters, the contributors The right of Maria Kronfeldner to be identified as the author of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Kronfeldner, Maria E., editor. Title:The Routledge handbook of dehumanization / edited by Maria Kronfeldner. Description:Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge, 2021. | Series: Routledge handbooks in philosophy | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2020027965 (print) | LCCN 2020027966 (ebook) | ISBN 9781138588158 (hardback) | ISBN 9780429492464 (ebook) Subjects: LCSH: Humanity. | Crimes against humanity. Classification: LCC BJ1533.H9 R68 2021 (print) | LCC BJ1533.H9 (ebook) | DDC 179.7–dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020027965 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020027966 ISBN: 978-1-138-58815-8 (hbk) ISBN: 978-0-429-49246-4 (ebk) Typeset in Bembo by KnowledgeWorks Global Ltd. BK-TandF-KRONFELDNER_9781138588158-200119-FM.indd 4 18/12/20 12:01 PM A stranger on a train, and you’re going down They’re gonna run you out of this town I wonder what your story is, why you in the gutter lie And who it was who ruined you, I wonder why? (The Tiger Lillies, Devil’s Fairground) v BK-TandF-KRONFELDNER_9781138588158-200119-FM.indd 5 18/12/20 12:01 PM CONTENTS List of contributors Preface Acknowledgments x xvi xviii 1 Introduction: Mapping dehumanization studies Maria Kronfeldner 1 PART I Oscillating boundaries, dimensions, and hierarchies of humanity in historical contexts 37 2 Dehumanization before the Columbian exchange Siep Stuurman 39 3 “Humanity” and its limits in early modern European thought László Kontler 52 4 Enlightenment humanization and dehumanization, and the orangutan Silvia Sebastiani 64 5 Dehumanizing the exotic in living human exhibitions Guido Abbattista 83 6 Dehumanizing strategies in Nazi ideology and their anthropological context Johannes Steizinger 98 vii BK-TandF-KRONFELDNER_9781138588158-200119-FM.indd 7 18/12/20 12:01 PM Contents 7 Theorizing the inhumanity of human nature, 1955-1985 Erika Lorraine Milam 112 PART II Further special contexts of dehumanization 125 8 The social psychology of dehumanization Nick Haslam 127 9 Dehumanization and the loss of moral standing Edouard Machery 145 10 Dehumanization and the question of animals Alice Crary 159 11 Dehumanization, disability, and eugenics Robert A.Wilson 173 12 Dehumanization and human rights Marie-Luisa Frick 187 13 Dehumanization by law Luigi Corrias 201 14 Dehumanization in literature and the figure of the perpetrator Andrea Timár 214 PART III The complex facets of dehumanization 229 15 Dehumanization and social death as fundamentals of racism Wulf D. Hund 231 16 How status and interdependence explain different forms of dehumanization Susan T. Fiske 245 17 Exploring metadehumanization and self-dehumanization from a target perspective Stéphanie Demoulin, Pierre Maurage, and Florence Stinglhamber 260 18 The dehumanization and rehumanization of refugees Victoria M. Esses, Stelian Medianu, and Alina Sutter 275 viii BK-TandF-KRONFELDNER_9781138588158-200119-FM.indd 8 18/12/20 12:01 PM Contents 19 Motivational and cognitive underpinnings of fear of social robots that become “too human for us” Maria Paola Paladino, Jeroen Vaes, and Jolanda Jetten 292 PART IV Conceptual and epistemological questions regarding dehumanization 20 Objectification, inferiorization, and projection in phenomenological research on dehumanization Sara Heinämaa and James Jardine 307 309 21 Why dehumanization is distinct from objectification Mari Mikkola 326 22 On hatred and dehumanization Thomas Brudholm and Johannes Lang 341 23 Dehumanization, the problem of humanity and the problem of monstrosity David Livingstone Smith 355 24 Psychological essentialism and dehumanization Maria Kronfeldner 362 25 Could dehumanization be perceptual? Somogy Varga 378 Index 392 ix BK-TandF-KRONFELDNER_9781138588158-200119-FM.indd 9 18/12/20 12:01 PM CONTRIBUTORS Guido Abbattista is Professor of Modern History at the University of Trieste (Italy). He is a specialist in 18th-century historical and political culture in France and in the Anglo-American world, with special reference to colonial and imperial themes and to the representations of human differences. In more recent times, he researched on live ethno-exhibitions in early modern Europe and in 19th- and 20th-century Italy and published the books Umanità in mostra. Esposizioni etniche e invenzioni esotiche in Italia (1880–1940) [Humans on Exhibition: Ethnic Expositions and Exotic Inventions in Italy (1880–1940)] (Trieste: EUT, 2013), and (edited), Moving Bodies, Displaying Nations: National Cultures, Race and Gender in World Exhibitions (Nineteenth-Twentieth Century) (Trieste: EUT, 2014). Thomas Brudholm is Associate Professor at the University of Copenhagen and a philosopher by training. In addition to emotions and dehumanization, his research interests include hate crime, genocide, transitional justice, and theory of science and the humanities. He is author of Resentment’s Virtue (Temple UP 2008) and has coedited several volumes, including Hate, Politics, Law (Oxford UP 2018); Emotions and Mass Atrocity (Cambridge UP 2018); and The Religious in Responses to Mass Atrocity (Cambridge UP 2009). Currently, Brudholm is focusing on issues arising from responses to perceived offenses in the context of higher education. Luigi Corrias is Assistant Professor of Philosophy of Law at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam (VU Amsterdam). His research falls broadly within the field of the philosophy of international law. In particular, he focuses on ethical and philosophical issues pertaining to international crim­ inal law, European integration, and constitutional theory. He is the author of The Passivity of Law: Competence and Constitution in the European Court of Justice (Springer, 2011), for which the Netherlands Association for Philosophy of Law awarded him the Prize for the Best Dissertation in Legal Philosophy in the Netherlands and Belgium, 2009–2010. He is currently engaged in an ongoing (book) project on humanity and dehumanization in international law. Alice Crary is University Distinguished Professor at the New School for Social Research (USA) and Visiting Fellow at Regent’s Park College, Oxford (UK). Her books include Beyond Moral Judgment, Inside Ethics, and edited collections and journal issues on Cavell, Diamond, Wittgenstein, and ordinary language philosophy. She publishes on topics including social phil­ osophy, moral philosophy, critical theory, aesthetics, critical animal studies, critical disability x BK-TandF-KRONFELDNER_9781138588158-200119-FM.indd 10 18/12/20 12:01 PM Contributors studies, and feminist theory. She is completing a book—Radical Animal—on why attention to animals is urgently necessary for liberating social thought. Stéphanie Demoulin is Professor in the Psychology Department at the Université catholique de Louvain (Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium). Her two main research interests focus on intergroup relations and negotiations. Early 2000, she was part of one of the research teams that introduced the topic of infrahumanization and dehumanization in social psychology. She is the (co)author of a number of articles published in various scientific journals, such as Personality and Social Psychology Review, Cognition and Emotion, and Social Cognition. She also coedited (with J.-Ph. Leyens and J. Dovidio) a book on Intergroup Misunderstandings (Psychology Press), coauthored another (with V. Yzerbyt) on Intergroup Relations (Presses universitaires de Grenoble), and is the author of Psychologie de la Négociation (Mardaga). Victoria M. Esses is Professor of Psychology and Director of the Network for Economic and Social Trends and of the Centre for Research on Migration and Ethnic Relations at the University of Western Ontario. She is also Principal Investigator of the Pathways to Prosperity Partnership, a national alliance of university, community, and government partners dedicated to fostering welcoming communities and promoting the integration of immigrants in Canada. Victoria is a Fellow of the CIFAR program Boundaries, Membership, and Belonging. Susan T. Fiske is Eugene Higgins Professor, Psychology and Public Affairs, at Princeton University. She investigates social cognition, especially cognitive stereotypes and emotional prejudices, at cultural, interpersonal, and neuroscientific levels.Author of about 400 publications and winner of numerous scientific awards, she was elected to the National Academy of Sciences. Sponsored by a Guggenheim, her Russell-Sage-Foundation book is Envy Up, Scorn Down: How Status Divides Us, which is relevant to varieties of dehumanizarion. With Taylor & Francis, she wrote five editions of a classic graduate text: Social Cognition, and authored, four editions of an advanced undergraduate text, Social Beings: Core Motives in Social Psychology. Marie-Luisa Frick is Associated Professor at the Department of Philosophy at the University of Innsbruck, Austria. Her fields of research are political and legal philosophy, and ethics and phil­ osophy of religion with a special emphasis on human rights. In 2016, she was a Visiting Fellow at Harvard Law School’s Human Rights Program. She has published in major journals in the field and has written the monography Human Rights and Relative Universalism (Palgrave 2019). Nick Haslam is Professor of Psychology at the University of Melbourne, Australia. In add­ ition to dehumanization, on which he published important contributions, his research interests include stigma, essentialist thinking, psychiatric classification, and the historical development of psychological concepts. Books authored by him include Introduction to Personality, Individual Differences and Intelligence (Sage 2017), and Psychology in the Bathroom (Palgrave 2012). Sara Heinämaa is Academy Professor (2017–2021 Academy of Finland) and Professor of Philosophy at the University of Jyväskylä. She specializes in phenomenology, philosophy of mind, and history of philosophy, and has published extensively in these fields, especially on embodi­ ment, personhood, intersubjectivity, emotions, and gender. She is coauthor of Birth, Death, and Femininity (2010) and author of Toward a Phenomenology of Sexual Difference (2003). She has coedited several volumes, including Phenomenology and the Transcendental (2014), New Perspectives to Aristotelianism and Its Critics (2014), and Consciousness (2007). xi BK-TandF-KRONFELDNER_9781138588158-200119-FM.indd 11 18/12/20 12:01 PM Contributors Wulf D. Hund is Emeritus Professor of Sociology at the University of Hamburg. He has worked in social philosophy, social history, and social conflicts. His main area of research is the theory and history of racism. His books in the latter field include Negative Vergesellschaftung (2006, 2nd ed. 2014), Rassismus (2007), Wie die Deutschen weiß wurden (2017), Rassismus und Antirassismus (2018), and edited volumes on Wages of Whiteness & Racist Symbolic Capital (2010, with Jeremy Krikler and David Roediger), Racism and Sociology (2014, with Alana Lentin), Simianization. Apes, Gender, Class, and Race (2015, with Charles W. Mills and Silvia Sebastiani). James Jardine is Postdoctoral Researcher at the Department of Social Sciences and Philosophy at the University of Jyväskylä. His research focuses on issues of emotion, selfhood, and intersub­ jectivity, and he adopts a phenomenological perspective that also seeks to address themes and questions from critical theory, social philosophy, and philosophy of mind. He has published on these topics in Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie, Metodo, and Human Studies, as well as in two other volumes of the Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy series. He is author of Empathy, Embodiment, and the Person (Springer, 2020) and coeditor of Perception and the Inhuman Gaze (Routledge, 2020). Jolanda Jetten is Professor of Social Psychology and an ARC Laureate Fellow at the University of Queensland, Australia (PhD, University of Amsterdam, 1997). She has published widely in top-tier journals on social identity, group processes, and intergroup relations in small interacting groups and larger social structures. Her most recent books include Together Apart:The Psychology of COVID-19 (with Reicher, Haslam and Cruwys, Sage, 2020), The Social Psychology of Inequality (with Peters, Springer, 2019), The New Psychology of Health: Unlocking the Social Cure (with Haslam, Cruwys, Dingle, and Haslam, Psychology Press, 2018), and The Wealth Paradox: Economic Prosperity and the Hardening of Attitudes Towards Minorities (with Mols; Cambridge University Press, 2017). László Kontler is Professor of History at Central European University (New York – Vienna ­ Budapest). His research and publications focus on intellectual history, the history of political thought, translation and reception, and the production and circulation of scientific knowledge in early modern Europe, mainly the Enlightenment. His recent books include Translations, Histories, Enlightenments: William Robertson in Germany, 1760–1795 (Palgrave, 2014) and (with Per Pippin Aspaas) Maximilian Hell (1720–1792) and the Ends of Jesuit Science in Enlightenment Europe (Brill, 2020). Maria Kronfeldner is Professor of Philosophy at Central European University (New York Vienna – Budapest). She works in the history and philosophy of the life sciences and social sciences, with a focus on causation, explanation, essentialism, diversity and unity, and science and values. She is editor of this Handbook, author of two books (What’s Left of Human Nature:A Postessentialist, Pluralist, and Interactive Account of a Contested Concept, 2018 with MIT Press; Darwinian Creativity and Memetics, 2011 with Routledge) and has published several peer-reviewed articles (one winning the Karl Popper Essay Prize, another the Philosophical Quarterly Essay Prize). She currently directs the Project The Epistemology of the In/Human. Johannes Lang is Senior Researcher at the Danish Institute for International Studies. He has criticized the concept of dehumanization in a series of articles, beginning with Questioning Dehumanization (2010) and most recently in The Limited Importance of Dehumanization in Collective Violence (2020). His latest book is a coedited volume on Emotions and Mass Atrocity (2018). Edouard Machery is Distinguished Professor in the Department of History and Philosophy of Science at the University of Pittsburgh and the Director of the Center for Philosophy of Science xii BK-TandF-KRONFELDNER_9781138588158-200119-FM.indd 12 18/12/20 12:01 PM Contributors at the University of Pittsburgh. He is the author of Doing Without Concepts (OUP, 2009) and of Philosophy Within Its Proper Bounds (OUP, 2017), as well as the editor of The Oxford Handbook of Compositionality (OUP, 2012), La Philosophie Expérimentale (Vuibert, 2012), Arguing about Human Nature (Routledge, 2013), and Current Controversies in Experimental Philosophy (Routledge, 2014). Pierre Maurage is a Senior Research Associate at the Belgian Fund for Scientific Research (F.R.S.—FNRS) and codirector of the Louvain Experimental Psychopathology research group at the Psychological Science Research Institute of the UCLouvain (Belgium). His research is mostly focused on the exploration, using combined experimental psychopathology and neuro­ science approaches, of the psychological and cerebral processes (cognition, emotion, and social interactions) involved in the development and maintenance of alcohol-related disorders. All information about his current research projects and all his publications are available on his lab’s website: http://www.uclep.be Stelian Medianu is a faculty member in the Psychology Department at Douglas College, New Westminster, British Columbia. He received his PhD in psychology with a specialization in migration and ethnic relations from Western University, London, Ontario. As a trained social psychologist, Stelian has used his research skills to better understand the factors that shape people’s attitudes toward immigrants and refugees. As a research and policy consultant, he has conducted policy studies, evaluation studies, and organizational reviews on behalf of federal and provincial governments as well as not-for-profit organizations. Mari Mikkola is the Chair in Metaphysics at the University of Amsterdam (The Netherlands). She is the author of two books (The Wrong of Injustice: Dehumanization and Its Role in Feminist Philosophy and Pornography:A Philosophical Introduction, both with OUP) and of several articles on feminist philosophy, social ontology, and pornography. Her current work is focused on philosoph­ ical methodology, with a monograph on this topic under contract with Oxford University Press. Erika Lorraine Milam is Professor of History at Princeton University. She is author of Creatures of Cain:The Hunt for Human Nature in Cold War America (2019) and Looking for a Few Good Males: Female Choice in Evolutionary Biology (2010). She has coedited with Suman Seth, Descent of Darwin: Race, Sex, and Human Nature (Themes,Vol. 6, 2021) and with Robert A. Nye, Scientific Masculinities (Osiris,Vol. 30, 2015). She currently serves as Chair of the Editorial Board for Historical Studies of the Natural Sciences. Milam’s most recent project delves into the history of long-term field research in behavioral ecology. Maria Paola Paladino is Professor of Social Psychology at the University of Trento. Her research focuses on how people perceive, relate, and behave toward other people, or social rele­ vant entities, as robots, with a special interest in the key role of humanness and dehumanization in these processes. She was one of the original proponents of the infra-humanization theory, and her approach and hypothesis influenced the current theorizing in the psychology of dehuman­ ization and object anthropomorphism. She is the (co-)author of a number of articles published in various scientific journals, such as Psychological Science, Social Cognition, and British Journal of Social Psychology. Silvia Sebastiani is Associate Professor at the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales in Paris. She is the author of The Scottish Enlightenment: Race, Gender, and the Limits of Progress (2013), and has co-edited, with Wulf Hund and Charles Mills, Simianization: Apes, Gender, Class, and xiii BK-TandF-KRONFELDNER_9781138588158-200119-FM.indd 13 18/12/20 12:01 PM Contributors Race (2015). More recently, she has edited the special issue on Les vitrines de l’humanité/Showcasing Humanity for the online journal Passés Futurs (2019). She is completing a book on the bound­ aries of humanity in the Enlightenment, especially focusing on the ways in which great apes contributed to the shaping of human sciences. David Livingstone Smith is Professor of Philosophy at the University of New England. He is author of nine books, including the award-winning Less Than Human: Why We Demean, Enslave, and Exterminate Others (St. Martin’s Press, 2011) and On Inhumanity: Dehumanization and How to Resist It (Oxford University Press, 2020). His work on dehumanization, racism, and related topics has been featured in the national and international media. He lectures widely on dehumanization in both academic and nonacademic settings, and spoke on dehumanization and mass violence at the 2012 G20 economic summit. Johannes Steizinger is Assistant Professor at McMaster University (Canada). He specializes in post-Kantian European philosophy. His systematic research interests include political philosophy, aesthetics, ethics, philosophy of race, and philosophy of biology. Recent publications include “The Significance of Dehumanization: Nazi Ideology and its Psychological Consequences” (Politics, Religion & Ideology 19:2 (2018), 139–157), “Relativism in the Context of National Socialism” (In: The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Relativism, Routledge 2019, 114–123), “National Socialism and the Problem of Relativism” (In: The Emergence of Relativism, Routledge, 233–251). Florence Stinglhamber is a Professor of Organizational Psychology and Human Resource Management in the Psychology Department at the Université catholique de Louvain (Belgium). Her main research interests include organizational dehumanization and perceived organiza­ tional/supervisor support. She is the (co-)author of a number of peer-reviewed articles published in international journals, such as Journal of Applied Psychology, Journal of Organizational Behavior, and Journal of Vocational Behavior. She is also the coauthor (with R. Eisenberger) of a book titled Perceived Organizational Support: Fostering Enthusiastic and Productive Employees (APA Books). Siep Stuurman is Emeritus Professor of the History of Ideas in Utrecht University, The Netherlands. He studies the ideas of humanity and equality from a world history perspective and publishes in the major journals of his field. His most recent book, The Invention of Humanity: Equality and Cultural Difference in World History (Harvard, 2017), received the 2019 Carlson Award, and his book on François Poulain de la Barre and the Invention of Modern Equality (Harvard, 2004) the 2005 George Mosse Prize by the American Historical Association. He is currently working on a global intellectual history of socioeconomic equality and inequality. Alina Sutter received her Master of Science in Psychology from the University of Zurich, Switzerland, and her PhD in Psychology from Western University, Canada. She is currently a Research Associate at Western University. Her research interests include topics such as public attitudes toward immigrants and refugees, as well as barriers immigrants and refugees face in their process of integration. Andrea Timár is Associate Professor at the Department of English Studies, Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest, and currently (2019/20) a research fellow at the Institute for Advanced Studies, Central European University. Her research and publications focus on 18th- and 19th-century literature and philosophy, contemporary literature, and critical theory. Her first xiv BK-TandF-KRONFELDNER_9781138588158-200119-FM.indd 14 18/12/20 12:01 PM Contributors monograph, A Modern Coleridge: Cultivation, Addiction, Habits (Palgrave Macmillan 2015), was nominated for the First Book Prize of the British Association for Romantic Studies. She is also the author of a volume of essays, The Human Form: Literature, Politics, Ethics from the Eighteenth Century to the Present (Eötvös Loránd University Press, 2020). Jeroen Vaes is Professor of Social Psychology at the University of Trento, Italy, and obtained his PhD in 2001 from the Catholic University of Louvain at Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium. His research focuses on humanness as a dimension of social judgment in intergroup relations, and in the realm of sexual and medical objectification. He has published numerous research articles and chapters on these topics in the most important outlets of social psychology and social neurosci­ ence. He also edited a book: Humanness and Dehumanization (with Bain and Leyens, Psychology Press, 2014). Somogy Varga is Professor of Philosophy at Aarhus University, Denmark, and Senior Research Associate at the University of Johannesburg, South Africa. He previously worked at the University of Memphis, the Institute of Cognitive Science at the University of Osnabrück, and the Institute of Social Research at Goethe University Frankfurt. He is the author of Authenticity as an Ethical Ideal (Routledge, 2011); Naturalism, Interpretation, and Mental Disorder (OUP, 2015); and Scaffolded Minds (MIT Press, 2019). Robert A. Wilson is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Western Australia, having taught previously at Queen’s University; the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign; the University of Alberta; and La Trobe University. His publications span the philosophy of mind, cognitive science, the philosophy of biology, and disability studies. He is the general editor (with Frank Keil) of the award-winning MIT Encyclopedia of the Cognitive Sciences (1999) and the author of Boundaries of the Mind (Cambridge, 2004) and Genes and the Agents of Life (2005). His most recent book is The Eugenic Mind Project (MIT Press, 2018); for his other recent work, see his website robwilsonphilosophy.com. Rob is also active in philosophy in the schools and in philo­ sophical engagement in public life. xv BK-TandF-KRONFELDNER_9781138588158-200119-FM.indd 15 18/12/20 12:01 PM PREFACE Take the civilians that are tortured, raped, or killed in the shameful line-up of wars and violent conflicts that we have stockpiled over historical time, with no end in sight. Take that homeless people, sick people, refugees, or those deemed ‘racially inferior’ are often treated in a far from respectful manner, likened to bacteria, vermin, or waste, and treated alike.Take the age-old view that women are only a ‘second’ sex with all the consequences this view has had for the oppression and the violence women have had to face.Take abusive work relations as part of which people are treated as exploitable machines. These are all paradigmatic examples of dehumanization occurring as part of our contemporary social world. Dehumanization happens when people are depicted, regarded, or treated as not human or less human. As a result, the dehumanized might, in fact, end up—in ‘the devil’s fairground’—with less than a human life. What ‘being human’ means as part of dehumanization varies, is often idealized, and is rarely about an easy-to-capture matter. Admittedly, the just-given characterization of dehumanization is almost trivially true. It simply points to the term ‘human,’ without specifying it further, and the prefix ‘de,’ which is used in words borrowed from Latin to indicate separation, privation, or negation. I start with such a thin notion since not much agreement exists beyond it in the scholarship on dehumanization, not even with respect to the above examples. Most scholars will count them as dehumanizing, while others will not.The skeptics will admit that the cases are describable as cases where the individ­ uals are depicted, regarded, or treated with less moral standing and less respect than other human beings.Yet, they will argue, these disparaged individuals are depicted, regarded, and treated in that way qua human beings. Most scholars will count the hatred that is part of genocides, rape, torture, and similar atrocities as dehumanizing, but some will not. Hatred, the latter will argue, involves per definition recognition of sorts. Despite these disagreements, the mentioned cases form a cluster of cases that most scholars will accept as dehumanizing in some sense. That also holds for the much studied, most often quoted, and in that sense paradigmatic if not enigmatic example of dehumanizing atrocities of the 20th century: the Holocaust. Since dehumanization often leads to inhuman treatment of people, it also holds that understanding dehumanization, the goal of this Handbook, can contribute to describing, explaining, and eventually preventing or at least exiting the resulting inhumanity, whether that consists in killing, enslaving, raping, torturing, hunting, or other forms of humiliation, oppression, subordination, coercion, exploitation, marginalization, inequality, injustice, discrimination, etc. xvi BK-TandF-KRONFELDNER_9781138588158-200119-FM.indd 16 18/12/20 12:01 PM Preface The related atrocities go by different names: murder, torture, rape, slavery, crimes against humanity, religious violence, genocides, politicides, ethnocides, democides, ecocides, etc. If dehumanization happens at the level of depiction or attitudes, it often leads to inhuman treatment. If dehumanization is actualized, then it consists in inhuman treatment of people, which amounts to a less than human life of people, or to the end of that life. Yet, neither implies that all inhuman treatments are due to dehumanization.There are clearly instances of inhuman treatment for which there are alternative and better descriptions and explanations rather than pointing to dehumanization. And even in cases in which dehumanization is descriptively and explanatorily adequate, it will be far from the complete story. In short, dehumanization is not in everything and never the whole story when ‘man’s inhumanity to man’ is at issue; but it is an existing phenomenon and a key aspect of inhumanity. Historically viewed, dehumanization is the dark side of humanism. Since the latter mainly belongs to the history of the intellectual traditions that descend from Greek Antiquity (conven­ tionally called the ‘West’), dehumanization does so too, even though it exists in other traditions as well. This Handbook focuses on dehumanization as part of the history of the West, without denying that it can be found in other traditions. Humanism frames and opposes dehumanization by two oscillating aspects of it: First, there is the idea of a universal humanity—that all human beings belong to the same kind and are equal in that respect. Second, there is the idea of a shared reciprocal humanness—that there are properties (capacities of humans), such as rationality, morality, civility, etc. that characterize how humans are, and how they treat and should treat each other reciprocally in specifically human ways.The different kinds of optimisms that were sometimes connected to humanism (mainly inscribed in ideas about different kinds of progress: educational, intellectual, moral, legal, social, etc.) have by now faded away considerably in many quarters of intellectual life.There is also an increasing awareness that humanness has often been defined in quite biased ways, and that this needs to change. Nonetheless, that there is a shared humanity and a shared reciprocal humanness (in some form) is still among the most fundamental ontological assumptions about human beings, at least as the ontology of the human developed in the West. It has found over time its scientific and philosophical echo in theories of human nature, moral standing, equality, and justice. It has found public codification, most importantly in the various legal initiatives and declarations concerning human rights, crimes against humanity, etc. Since dehumanization is the direct mirror of the notion that there is a shared humanity and a reciprocal humanness, it is a more elementary notion compared to humiliation or loss of dignity, which are related but richer notions. The question that drives this Handbook, which is the first of its kind, is this: How can one make sense of dehumanization across disciplinary boundaries of the humanities and the social sciences? Maria Kronfeldner xvii BK-TandF-KRONFELDNER_9781138588158-200119-FM.indd 17 18/12/20 12:01 PM 1 INTRODUCTION Mapping dehumanization studies Maria Kronfeldner This Introduction aims to map the landscape of dehumanization studies, with its history, multiple facets, steep abysses, and muddy waters. The multidisciplinary field of dehumanization studies is rather young and vibrant but with an age-old implicit heritage. It has some stable islands of disciplinary discourses, or interpretations that follow certain traditions of thought and use a spe­ cific set of methods—for example, historical, phenomenological, and conceptual analysis, or the various empirical methods from the social sciences. Overall, the field is rather patchy. And, as any important phenomenon studied, dehumanization has its staunch skeptics. The Handbook aims to revisit, connect, consolidate, and synthesize the insights that have been reached so far, in order to arrive at a new solid plateau for making progress in understanding dehumanization. It aims to do so without reducing the complexity in the phenomena at issue and without overextending the limits of the category of dehumanization.The aim is not to see dehumanization everywhere; the aim is to understand it in its multifaceted depth. Section 1.1 will briefly portray the history of the field. The systematically minded Sections 1.2–1.5 will guide the reader through the resulting rugged landscape represented in the Handbook’s contributions. Section 1.2 distinguishes between different realizations, levels, and forms of dehumanization and will point to three ontological contrasts operative in it. Section 1.3 will add some remarks on the variety of targets of dehumanization, its valence, and emotional aspects. Section 1.4 is on causes, functions, and consequences of dehumanization, and on the prospects for reducing or undoing it. I will close the systematic overview in Section 1.5 with a discussion of some important theoretical complexities that arise in studying dehumanization. Most of the issues mentioned in Sections 1.2–1.5 are of crossdisciplinary concern—that is, they arise in most if not all subfields of dehumanization studies. This is the case even though—as Section 1.1 will show—the subfields focus on different subissues and might even use a different analytic language to address the same subissue. Section 1.6 will situate dehumanization studies in the broader intellectual landscape of debates about the ‘human’ in the humanities and social sciences. Readers who wish to first find out how dehumanization relates to posthumanism or transhumanism and like discussions are advised to first go to Section 1.6. Section 1.7 will describe the scope, limitations, and intended readership of the Handbook. Sections 1.1 and 1.7 will refer to the chapters’ individual contributions in a systematic and integrated rather than a linear manner.The reader can also find the abstracts of the individual contributions in the linear order of their appearance in Section 1.8. 1 BK-TandF-KRONFELDNER_9781138588158-200119-Chp01.indd 1 18/12/20 12:04 PM Maria Kronfeldner 1.1 Remarks on the history of the field The term ‘dehumanization’ emerges in English around the turn of the 19th century. The Oxford English Dictionary quotes with respect to first usage from the 1818 diary of Thomas Moore (published 1853).While Moore (1779–1852), an Irish poet, wrote about a dehumanized face of a boxer and was thus concerned with appearance of human bodies, usage was quickly broadened to include reference to social conditions. For instance, in his Narrative of a visit to the Mauritius and South Africa (1844) the English Quaker missionary James Backhouse (1794–1869) writes about a “fallen” world that he encountered, with conditions that are “gloomy,” “dark,” and “hopeless,” inhabited by “savage tribes.” About the latter, he asked,“By what means shall these be raised up to the condition of men? How shall these almost dehumanized creatures be formed into orderly societies?” (Backhouse 1844: 109; Emph. in the original) The set of phenomena denoted by the term ‘dehumanization’, as it is used in practice and as it is studied in the Handbook, has certainly been addressed much earlier than the 19th century, and actually it has been since Greek antiquity. It has been addressed in particular by those who defended a shared humanity and humanness – that is, by the critics of those cases of dehumanization that showed up in social reality. Stuurman (this volume), Kontler (this volume), and Sebastiani (this volume) provide historical insights into that deep history of addressing dehumanization.The contexts, in which avantla-lettre reflections on dehumanization occurred, certainly varied and did so not only in time but also in topical orientation.They were part of discussions on diversity, assimilation, exclusion, purity and danger, education, religious belief, sexuality, misogyny, hatred, wars, savagery, barbarism, cannibalism, slavery, racism, ethnocentrism, egocentrism, evolutionary thinking, anatomy, perfectibility and civility, progress, the exotic, missionary or colonial activities, public events, and so on. As Stuurman (this volume) shows, there were times when dehumanization was not in need of justification. Aristotle, an example Stuurman mentions, lived at a time when a shift toward a critical discourse about dehumanization surfaced, and with it there rose the need to justify it in face of the critique. Aristotle’s defense of natural slavery, as Stuurman argues, is thus already a reaction to critical stances regarding the attitudes and treatment of slaves. Thus, the begin­ ning of the intricate dialectic of humanization, dehumanization, and rehumanization, which the Handbook addresses, is also the beginning of what historians call the ‘invention of humanity’—the historically increasing awareness and belief that there is a shared humanity and humanness (see Preface). This invention is ongoing, with oscillating boundaries of humanity and humanness ever since. Kontler (this volume), for instance, shows how contingent the standard of belonging to humanity was in the different debates about the human during the early Enlightenment: if expedient (in order to exclude certain people), the standard simply got adapted. And today? The boundaries of the human are still negotiated, and convenient adaptation of standards still occurs, even though the details in the strategies and the ontologies might have changed. Beliefs in ‘true religion,’ a worn strategy on which Stuurman and Kontler both report, are for some still the basis of an active category that allows the differentiation between ‘real’ humans and erro­ neous ones; for others, this strategy is replaced by the imagined community of a ‘nation,’ or a ‘race,’ etc. Us-versus-them thinking has never vanished fully, even though its contours changed. Nonetheless, the invention of humanity led to a universalist frame and, eventually, to a truly global era, with an ever-increasing global interdependence of people and states, an interdepend­ ence so deep that some simply took it for granted—till its current weight and vulnerability became fully exposed as part of the 2020 Covid-19 pandemic. Even though the history of humanism and dehumanization extends beyond the West, as Stuurman (2017, this volume) shows, the Handbook sets its focus on the history of dehuman­ ization in the West.Within the traditions of the West, it seems that the study of dehumanization 2 BK-TandF-KRONFELDNER_9781138588158-200119-Chp01.indd 2 18/12/20 12:04 PM Introduction (with or without using the word) surfaces whenever humanity looks at its very own atrocities (unfortunately, most of the times by looking back). It is thus not surprising that the contemporary multidisciplinary field explicitly studying dehumanization has its starting point in reactions to the Second World War (WWII) and its atrocities, in particular the Holocaust.Arendt (1951, 1963, 1971) is most often mentioned in that respect.Arendt wrote about losing, first, the “right to have rights”, then, one’s moral personhood, and, finally, one’s individuality – three stages of dehuman­ ization in the Nazi camps. She added her account of the “banality of evil,” which, in part, rested on her philosophical anthropology of the vita activa, and on her claim that Adolf Eichmann and other perpetrators of the Holocaust were unable to think and were, thus, in that sense not (fully) human themselves.1 Levi (1947), Améry (1966), Delbo (1970), and other Holocaust survivors added their own reflections and impressions on the loss of humanity as part of the horror they had to bear—and then witness. Brudholm and Lang (this volume, Brudholm 2008) refer to their narratives. Klemperer (1947) documented the dehumanized and dehumanizing language of the ‘Third Reich’—the lingua tertii imperii (LTI). Sartre (1937), de Beauvoir (1949), and Fanon (1952) should also be mentioned as early sources for contemporary dehumanization studies, as Heinämaa and Jardine (this volume) stress, be it with respect to the colonial context or the gendered facets of dehumanization, or of their intersections. Montagu (1942, 1968, Montagu and Matson 1983), most known for his work on aggression and racism, also belongs to that history, as Milam (2019, this volume) shows. A core concern for Montagu was how modern technology increases the prevalence of dehumanization in contemporary society. In psychology, Allport’s (1954) account of prejudice and Goffman’s (1963) account of stigma can be regarded as early influences, not focused on dehumanization explicitly, but preparing the ground for studying dehumanization as part of social psychology.2 These are just a few important examples from the post–WWII context. The history of this impetus from the post-WWII intellectual climate, and its impact in the multiple fields of the humanities and social sciences with respect to dehumanization, still awaits in-depth analysis. It is a history that is beyond the scope of the Handbook since it is a metahistory of dehumanization studies, with its own challenges – not only because of the multidisciplinarity involved, but also because it is a history that probably involves some underground, military-funded ‘secret rivers.’3 From what is readily available about that history, it is clear that the explicit study of dehumanization surfaced with considerable force during the Cold War, and in particular at the time of the Vietnam War.Taking the psychodynamic perspective of a therapist, Bernard et al. (1971) discussed dehumanization as a psychic defense mechanism that accompanies indifference and apathy, which function as responses to social problems or grave threats, such as nuclear anni­ hilation or pandemic outbreaks. Kelman (1973) and Bandura et al. (1975), finally, introduced the term ‘dehumanization’ to the experimental study of violence. Over time, attention to dehuman­ ization increased steadily, albeit slowly, peaking in the 1990s. Dehumanization was then studied as a part of evil (Staub 1989), as intergroup aggression distinct from ingroup bias (Schwartz and Struch 1989), as contributing to genocides (Kuper 1982, 1989), as a form of delegitimization (Bar-Tal 1989), and as one of the symptoms of moral exclusion (Opotow 1990a, b). At that time, a broadening of the horizon toward more graded and implicit forms of dehu­ manization began, in particular as part of social psychology. Opotow (1990a, b), for instance, distinguished (albeit, implicitly) between three forms of exclusion in which dehumanization can play a part: exclusion within a society (e.g., via barriers to professions or citizen rights), exclu­ sion from a society (e.g., by deportation or detention), and exclusion from life (annihilation via working to death or other ways of killing).4 In effect, social psychology took dehumanization more and more often as a complex, subtle, and widespread phenomenon (or set of phenomena) of social life that can be studied in detail in the psychologists’ labs, using the various empir­ ical methods available to that field. The history of studying dehumanization as part of social 3 BK-TandF-KRONFELDNER_9781138588158-200119-Chp01.indd 3 18/12/20 12:04 PM Maria Kronfeldner psychology, the most thriving subfield of the emerging multidisciplinary field of dehumanization studies, is covered in detail by Haslam (this volume), who, starting with Haslam et al. (2005), has substantially contributed to the later parts of that history.5 The spurt of research in social psych­ ology began with the infrahumanization account of Leyens et al. (2000).6 Haslam et al. (2005) then added the mechanistic-animalistic humanness model (see, Haslam, this volume), Fiske et al. (2002) contributed the stereotype content model (see Fiske 2011, Fiske, this volume), and Gray et al. (2007) added the agency-experience mind perception model. Again, these are just some of the most important recent contributions, reviewed in more detail by Haslam (this volume) and Fiske (this volume). The latter approach, the mind perception model, is also discussed as part of experimental philosophy and philosophy of mind.7 In these fields, the focus is on how we access and assess other minds and mental properties, how the alleged mental properties connect to moral standing, and on why we are cognitively so prone to recognize the humanity of others, which also has its impact on how we deal with robots, as discussed by Paladino et al. (this volume). When Opotow and others discussed social exclusion as part of the social psychology tradition, sociological works on socialization and social death surfaced as well, in particular following the work of Patterson (1982), with its focus on the history of racism. Hund (this volume) reviews and discusses the thus-inspired sociological tradition of research on dehumanization. In other areas of sociology, and moving more to the present scholarship, Pugh (2004), Hagan and RymondRichmond (2008), Bleiker et al. (2013), and Weissmann (2015), to name but a few, studied how institutions organize and frame dehumanization. At issue are the organizational and collective dynamics of dehumanization, with varying subissues (e.g., security threat construction, media and propaganda) and within different contexts (e.g., genocides, the dehumanization of refugees, torture). Some approaches to contemporary political thinking also take dehumanization in one form or another as fundamental (e.g.,Agamben 2004,Vetlesen 2005, and Savage 2013). Certainly, genocide studies as well as peace and conflict studies have their own tradition of discussing dehumanization. Kuper (1989) reviews in detail the history of references to dehuman­ ization in what is now called the first-generation of scholars in comparative genocide studies. Kuper accepted dehumanization as a phenomenon that exists at a cognitive, institutional, and ideological level.Yet, he already recommended caution with respect to over-attributing dehu­ manization, for three reasons. First, dehumanization might be an implausible explanation for the occurrence of a specific case of violence at the level of an individual perpetrator’s cognition, as well as at the level of explaining the collective onset of the violence, even in cases in which there is clearly an ideology of dehumanization operating. Dehumanization, in other words, can appear at any one of the three levels, independent of its occurrence at the other levels. Second, dehumanization “may not be necessary” (ibid.: 161) for the violence occurring if alternative explanations are possible (whatever the level of occurrence at issue).Third, caution should guide us with respect to a frequent assumption backing the “dehumanization thesis”.That assumption is the claim that human beings generally have an inhibition to kill members of their own kind; for Kuper, it is a questionable postulate. Despite such early skeptical tones, dehumanization is still debated as part of genocide studies, and mostly listed as one among a set of mechanisms that are taken to be involved in conflicts and genocides.8 The function of dehumanization can thus be compared to other mechanisms. Hence,Williams and Neilsen (2016) claim that dehumaniza­ tion makes killings merely tolerable (e.g., in the Khmer Rouge genocide in Cambodia, the case they refer to), whereas toxification, treated as a distinct mechanism, makes the killings necessary. Accordingly, dehumanization (as defined by them) is not sufficient for explaining genocides. Intellectual history and the history of ideas have so far primarily focused on dehumaniza­ tion in specific contexts of emerging modernity: natural law theories, taxonomical ordering, and colonial encounters. The issues discussed include dehumanization in the context 4 BK-TandF-KRONFELDNER_9781138588158-200119-Chp01.indd 4 18/12/20 12:04 PM Introduction of changing contours of concepts such as ‘race’ and ‘gender,’9 the ‘savage,’10 being ‘wild’ (e.g., Horigan 1989), the ‘exotic’ (Abbattista 2011, this volume), ‘monstrous’ people (e.g., Friedman 1981, Davies 2017), or the ‘subhuman’ (Smith 2011, 2020, this volume), or simply discussions of how ‘aliens’ or ‘enemies’ have been dehumanized, as in Koselleck (2006) or Stichweh (2010). Special focus has been on the ‘discovery of mankind,’11 the ‘invention of human science’ (Fox et al 1995), the history of the idea of human rights (Hunt 2007, Slaughter 2007), the history of human-looking automata (LaGrandeur 2013,Voskuhl 2013), the history of racism (Smith 2015; Hund, this volume), the history of simianization and the ape-human boundary,12 the history of exhibiting humans,13 and the relationship between theories of natural law, stadial history, and dehumanization (Wokler 1988, Kontler 2012, this volume). History and philosophy of science is mostly focused on how dehumanization connects to naturalization of difference and inequality.14 Dehumanization can in that context also refer to the dehumanization of the overall species, as Milam (2019, this volume) shows. In such a case, all humans are dehumanized since they are reduced to the specifically animal-like parts of being human, often called ‘human nature.’ That ‘nature’ has often been taken to be biologic­ ally inherited and in that sense determined. Even though this form of dehumanization applies to all humans, it can have significant trickle-down effect on the dehumanization of specific groups of humanity, since the existing social and cultural inequalities are naturalized thereby as well. Kronfeldner (2018, this volume) analyzes how dehumanization connects to the concept of human nature and the implied essentialism, while Steizinger (2018, this volume) compares nat­ uralist and non-naturalist background theories of the Nazi regime. Milam (2019, this volume) portrays how naturalizing humanity and inequality unfolded in Cold War contexts. Literary studies and technology studies connect to the above-mentioned historical works and add their specific perspectives. Literary studies analyze the respective literal reverberations of dehumanization. Different narrative structures are analyzed as part of it – for example, the literary grotesque (as in Cassuto 1997), narrative empathy (Keen 2011), or narrative structures with an ‘unreliable’ narrator (Zunshine 2006), to name a few (see Timár 2019, this volume).Technology studies analyze whether technology makes us less human. Bernard et al. (1971) and Montagu and Matson (1983) are early examples of such an orientation (see Milam, this volume). It finds res­ onance in contemporary critical stances regarding our consumer culture (see, for instance,Tester 1995). Building more specifically on the history of automata, there is contemporary work in robotics that discusses how the humanization of robots connects to the threat of dehumanization (e.g., in the sense of a desensitization regarding social relations). For review of the work in that field and the involved issues, see Paladino et al. (this volume). Discussions in literary studies and technology studies are closely related to discussions in critical theory and cultural sociology that state that misrecognition, or treating individual humans instrumentally (i.e., as objects rather than subjects), is a key phenomenon in the creation and stabilization of social inequalities of all kinds (e.g., in exploitation as part of capitalist societies).15 Certain forms of dehumanizing speech and media depiction are analyzed in media and visual studies and in philosophy of language, with connections to genocide studies and empirical analyzes of propaganda.16 Straus (2007), for instance, did a detailed empirical study of the hatred distributed via radio as part of the Rwandian genocide. Volpato et al. (2010) compared fascist propaganda with contemporary right-wing propaganda in Italy. With respect to dehumanization, they “found in images what was left unsaid in words” (Volpato et al. 2010: 275). In feminist philosophy and gender studies, a lot has been written on the dehumaniza­ tion of women since de Beauvoir discussed it, in part with reference to sexual objectifica­ tion involved in pornography, rape proclivity, domestic violence, and so on.17 Connected to moral theory, dehumanization is discussed in disability studies and animal studies that critically 5 BK-TandF-KRONFELDNER_9781138588158-200119-Chp01.indd 5 18/12/20 12:04 PM Maria Kronfeldner discuss various issues related to dehumanization.The continuing legacy of eugenics belongs here (see Wilson 2018, this volume).There are discussions about animal–human comparisons and the resulting ‘humanization’ of animals (Opotow 1993, Costello and Hodson 2010). Others discuss human–animal comparisons resulting in ‘animalization’ of disabled people.18 There are discussions on whether it is appropriate to compare animal slaughter and the Holocaust (Crary 2019). Some speak of ‘linked oppression’ of people and animals (e.g.,Wyckoff 2014).These discussions often relate to the claim that humanism wrongly relies on ‘speciesism’ (McMahan 2002, Singer 2009, Kagan 2016), according to which all and only Homo sapiens have moral standing (see Crary, this volume). All these debates relate to ideas about moral standing (see Machery, this volume). Legal studies, finally, discuss the history and justification of laws and legal categories in connection with dehumanization, in particular with respect to the concept of human rights (Rorty 1998, Meyers 2016, Frick, this volume), crimes against humanity (Geras 2011, Corrias 2016), and similar ideas – for instance, that war criminals or torturers should be conceptualized as enemies of humanity (see Luban 2018; Corrias, this volume; Frick, this volume). This short overview of the history and ‘state of the art’ of dehumanization studies is necessarily patchy (as is, in the end, the selection of contributions for the Handbook).The aim is not com­ pleteness, but to illustrate how burgeoning the field is, especially given its rich, multidisciplinary nature. The Handbook treats the multidisciplinarity involved as a chance rather than a burden. It allows comparisons of the concepts and evidence from multiple angles, sometimes consolidating the evidence gathered in other fields, sometimes exposing frictions and opportunities for further research.The following Sections 1.2–1.5 shall guide the reader through the existing landscape of dehumanization studies in a more systematic manner. 1.2 Realizations, levels, forms, and ontological contrasts There are, clearly, different realizations of dehumanization, even if we focus on individuals only (rather than structures and institutions as dehumanizing). Dehumanization can occur at the level of discourse or rhetoric (e.g., in media or propaganda), which can be strategic and figurative only—that is, not reflecting actual attitudes of the respective speakers.Yet, even if dehumanizing depictions are strategically used only, they are usually meant to influence the thoughts and acts of those listening or watching. Dehumanization can thus also be cognitive, inscribed in real attitudes of people. These dehumanizing attitudes often have a behavioral counterpart, be it verbal or nonverbal. Different accounts of dehumanization may thus address different levels of realization, or give priority to one of the levels. Mikkola (2016, this volume) defines dehumanization with a focus on actual behavior, whereas Smith (2011; 2020, this volume) does so with a focus on attitudes. Frick (this volume) distinguishes between latent dehumanization (cognitive), expressivist or activist dehu­ manization (linguistic), and actualized (behavioral) dehumanization. Social psychology focuses—by disciplinary perspective—on the cognitive side of the matter, yet some studies in social psychology cross the disciplinary borders of their field to other areas—for example, media analysis. Esses et al. (this volume), for instance, set a focus on dehumanizing media coverage, an area that has also been studied independently of social psychology (see references in Esses et al., this volume). Since the different levels at which dehumanization can show up interact, Heinämaa and Jardine (this volume) stress that whether a cognitive attitude or a certain rhetorical, pictorial, or linguistic depiction is actually dehumanizing or not depends on the practical and emotive context. In addition, causal influences can go both ways: dehumanizing rhetoric or attitudes can cause dehumanizing behavior, but they can also be the result of previous dehumanizing behavior. In the former case, the dehumanizing rhetoric or attitude motivates actions, and in the latter case 6 BK-TandF-KRONFELDNER_9781138588158-200119-Chp01.indd 6 18/12/20 12:04 PM Introduction the exhibited dehumanizing behavior is rationalized ex post facto—that is, justified after the fact by referring to a dehumanized status of the targets.Thus, the relationship between the three levels of dehumanization (latent/cognitive, rhetoric/discoursive/expressivist, and actualized/behavioral) can be quite complex and will vary from case to case or from context to context. It is thus important to note that inferences from one level to the other have to be made with care, because they can exist—despite interacting—separately too. Hence, even if dehumanizing actions can be performative and thus transformative, as Eichler (2019) stresses—making the life of those depicted, regarded, and treated actually less human—that kind of actualized dehumanization might occur without dehumanization at the other levels, and vice versa. Dehumanization also has levels that go beyond the rhetoric, thoughts, and actions of individuals. It can be inscribed in ideologies, philosophies, and scientific theories;19 it can be inscribed in institutions, such as the law (Corrias, this volume), or in business organizations and their respective work relations (Caesens et al. 2019; see Demoulin et al., this volume). Dehumanization is also inscribed in hierarchical social structures and relations, which have to be perpetually reproduced to stabilize the respective dehumanization.The ‘subalterns’ (i.e., those rendered passive through the hierarchies) would indeed speak without that stabilization, as Hund (this volume) mentions. In addition, Fiske et al. (2002, 2011, this volume) show that dehumaniza­ tion relates to status and the competitive or cooperative interdependence of people in a society. As a result, certain kinds of dehumanization increase with the inequality in a society, and with the respective meritocratic beliefs about deserving or not deserving status, power, inclusion, respect, help, and so on. Data on this come from a large variety of countries, as Fiske (this volume) reports. Dehumanization is also inscribed in cultural practices—for example, in schemes of exhibiting humans (Abbattista 2011, 2013, 2014, this volume), or in literature (Timár 2019, this volume), to name but two such practices. There are also different forms of dehumanization. Historically, dehumanization often involved categorically denying some human beings membership in the human kind. The latter has often been identified with a genealogical category (e.g., the biological species Homo sapiens). Polygenists, for instance, regarded slaves as outside of humanity because they believed that slaves have no shared ancestry with Europeans. Today, dehumanization still occurs in such an either/ or (i.e., categorical) form. Smith (2011, 2020, this volume) sets a focus on this form.Yet, dehu­ manization exists also in a graded form. People are regarded as more or less human even though they are simultaneously clearly recognized and regarded as humans – for example, women when they are objectified, or refugees or foreigners when they are deindividualized or even demonized. These graded forms are mainly (even though not exclusively) addressed in contemporary social psychology, as reviewed in Haslam (this volume). For historical roots of such graded forms and the discourses about them, see Kontler (this volume), Kronfeldner (this volume) and Sebastiani (this volume).This means that dehumanization can happen even if no sharp boundary between humans and non-humans is assumed, and even if no sharp boundaries between groups of humans are assumed. For dehumanization to operate, shades are enough. Neither racism nor speciesism are necessary for it, even though the latter undoubtedly can further it. In addition, contexts of atrocities are not the only contexts in which dehumanization occurs. It is much more pervasive. Finally, while dehumanization is still often explicit or “blatant,” as Opotow (2011) and Kteily et al. (2015, 2017) call it, it is also encoded in implicit attitudes that influence explicit opinions and actions (see for instance, Esses et al., this volume). Dehumanization can be theorized with a focus on certain properties that are taken as specific or typical for a human life (humanness). These humanness properties, the assumed insignia of humanity, are then shown to be attributed differentially to different people, for example: sec­ ondary emotions (as in Leyens et al. 2000), traits of human nature that allow us to distinguish 7 BK-TandF-KRONFELDNER_9781138588158-200119-Chp01.indd 7 18/12/20 12:04 PM Maria Kronfeldner ourselves from machines, as Haslam et al. (2005) added (see Haslam, this volume), mental prop­ erties such as agency and experience (Gray et al. 2007; Sytsma and Machery 2012; see Machery, this volume), competence and warmth (see Fiske 2011, this volume), harmfulness (Piazza et al. 2014; see Machery, this volume), prosociality (Schwartz and Struch 1989; Esses et al. 2008; see Esses et al., this volume), cooperation versus aggression (see Milam 2019, this volume), or eugenic traits (see Wilson 2018, this volume).This is an open list, and historians will add still further foci of dehumanization. Kontler (2004), for instance, shows how values like softness, grace, polite­ ness, refinement, and the like were used to limit women’s ‘proper’ role in modern commercial societies, torn as women were (and often still are) between two alternative roles of ‘beauty or beast,’ as part of the Enlightenment ideas of humanity’s progress (see also Kontler, this volume; Sebastiani, this volume). Yet, dehumanization is not only about properties that are differentially attributed to different (kinds of) people. It is about how the differential attribution of properties leads to further judgments about the people. Hence, Machery (this volume) shows how it connects to moral standing.Wilson (this volume) claims that it is crucial (philosophically) to distinguish between taking a certain property to be negative (e.g., a certain disease or impairment) and using it to devalue people (and their life). The former is not in and of itself dehumanizing, whereas the latter is.Varga (2017, 2020, this volume) similarly shows that there is a difference between mind perception and perceiving specific mental properties in others. Heinämaa and Jardine (this volume) add that a stance that looks at the typical (rather than the irreducible sub­ jective) can already be dehumanizing, irrespective of which property is looked at specifically. Dehumanization is, according to that approach, happening already when the very subjectivity and individuality of a person is ignored (i.e., when the individual is reduced to being a mere bearer of typical properties, whichever). Stuurman (this volume) reminds us that religious mem­ bership properties (rather than substantial properties) were decisive for dehumanization as part of religious worldviews. Being a believer in the religious truth rather than any substantive prop­ erty of the individual grounded dehumanization in such a case. Kronfeldner (2018, this volume) also stresses that dehumanization can be purely relational: somebody can be regarded as less human if fewer or less intense biological or social relations exist between the dehumanizer and the dehumanized. Differential attribution of properties can be part of such a relational dehu­ manization, but it does not have to be. With this in mind, Kronfeldner (this volume) claims that psychological essentialism, which is based on the attribution of intrinsic properties, is not necessary for dehumanization, even though it is often associated with it (as claimed, for instance, by Smith, this volume). Pointing in a similar direction, Kontler (2012, this volume) mentions that, as part of the naturalization of man during the Enlightenment, differences between people were de-internalized. Rather than finding difference only in static classifications of bodies (e.g., racial ones), or body-versus-soul ontologies (with the dehumanized ones lacking soul, or mind), difference was now also located in the differences in historical development, which points to a dynamic (rather than static) difference and a relational standard for humanness – namely, dis­ tance in historical development. Nonetheless, looking at the mentioned properties (e.g., autonomy, agency, experience, sec­ ondary emotions) is informative. They can be operative on top of the relations driving dehu­ manization. Most importantly, they show that some recurring ontological contrasts are operative in dehumanization. Dehumanization often builds on a contrast between animals and humans or a contrast between machines and humans. Haslam et al. (2005, see also Haslam, this volume) regard the focus on secondary emotions (also called ‘human uniqueness traits’) in Leyens et al. as biased toward human superiority over animals. According to Haslam, a sense of being human that is oriented at sentient animacy, which is more related to contrasting humans and machines, 8 BK-TandF-KRONFELDNER_9781138588158-200119-Chp01.indd 8 18/12/20 12:04 PM Introduction has often been ignored. Certainly, a lot depends on how the animalistic dehumanization (not much agency or secondary emotions attributed) and the mechanistic dehumanization (not much experience or animacy attributed) are measured in the respective empirical work.20 In addition, the relationship between these two sources of dehumanization, fueled by the two ontological contrasts, is complex, as Haslam (this volume) shows. Machery (this volume) agrees and adds evi­ dence from experimental philosophy confirming that the two sources of moral standing (agency and experience) can act independently but also additively. This makes it clear (as Machery, this volume, claims) that none of the typical philosophical traditions analyzing moral standing is right: for real people, both the Kantian agency and the Utilitarian experience are important in treating each other as part of a moral community. A third ontological contrast is the one between demons, angels or gods versus humans. To regard women as witches, which relates to considerable violence against women accumulated over history, is a case in which the demon versus human contrast was important, as Frick (this volume) mentions. In current scholarly work, this third contrast seems to have received less attention, but probably this is due to an increase in a-religious ontologies in the West. In the frame of the mentioned psychological accounts of dehumanization, it might even be reducible to mechanistic dehumanization—that is, attribution of agency but not (much) experience. The form of dehumanization will vary with the idea of being human that is operative in each respective case (see also Bain et al. 2014 on that issue). This also explains (in part at least) the usage of slightly different words for different forms of dehumanization. Leyens et al. (2000) have introduced the term ‘infrahumanization’ (as different from dehumanization) to focus on graded forms of differential attribution of secondary emotions taken to be unique for humans (and thus what it means to be human rather than just another animal). Smith (2011) aims at a similar bifurcation when he uses ‘subhumanization’ (less than human) and ‘dyshumanization’ (less human), the first involving a categorical difference in essence, while the later involves only degrees of being human. ‘Superhumanization’ (more human), ‘metadehumanization,’ and ‘selfdehumanization’ are also part of the recent literature. Smith (this volume) addresses the first and Demoulin et al. (this volume) the latter two. The term ‘ontologization’ is used similarly to ‘naturalization’; the words ‘deindividualization,’ ‘depersonalization,’ and ‘desocialization’ signal what exactly is at issue: the human as an individual, person, or member of a society. Ever since Marx, ‘alienation’ has a special valence as part of social philosophy. At issue is dehumanization that stems from work relationships that lead to selfestrangement and then selfdehumanization. Demoulin et al. (this volume) show how it is studied in contemporary psychology. Terms like ‘zoomorphism,’ ‘animalization,’ ‘simianization,’ ‘barbarization,’ ‘objectification,’ ‘commodification,’ ‘instrumentalization,’ ‘derivatization,’ ‘monstrification,’ ‘deification,’ ‘demonization,’ ‘diabolization,’ ‘bestialization,’‘verminization,’ and ‘toxification’ can all be found in connection with dehuman­ ization.They focus more on what one is or becomes in the mind of the dehumanizer as a result of dehumanization – namely, an animal, an object, a commodity, a demon, a toxic entity, and so on. As mentioned, the relationships between all these forms, realizations, levels, contexts, and aspects of dehumanization can be complex.This is why Frick (this volume), Heinämaa and Jardine (this volume), and Mikkola (this volume) all discuss how not to equate objectification and dehumanization, focusing on different traditions or contexts of comparing objectification and dehumanization. An important distinction in that respect, used by Frick (this volume) and Mikkola (this volume), is between reductive and non-reductive attitudes. There is no point in shortcutting the complexities stemming from the different forms, realizations, levels, contexts, and aspects studied. Yet from the abstract and general point of view, one aspect seems to be always present: dehumanization establishes difference and distance between human beings. Dehumanization enables a stratified organization of humanity. 9 BK-TandF-KRONFELDNER_9781138588158-200119-Chp01.indd 9 18/12/20 12:04 PM Maria Kronfeldner 1.3 Targets, valence, and emotions The targets of dehumanization vary greatly over time and cultural context, and can consist of individuals or groups.That it matters whether it is individuals or groups becomes evident in the history of exhibiting humans, a history that moves from individuals exhibited as oddities to indi­ viduals and groups exhibited as representing a type, as Abbattista (this volume) shows. The targets (whether as individuals or groups) often overlap with the targets of racism, sexism, classism, ableism, ageism, meritocracy, and so on. Dehumanization is, nonetheless, not equivalent to the latter since they are more specific (see also Section 1.5 and 1.6). Recently, the traditional focus on gender, races, and classes has been broadened so that further targets come into focus. There are studies on refugees,21 patients,22 disabled people,23 elderly people,24 low-status people,25 LGBTQ people,26 and even on children dehumanized by other children,27 and so on. For more on the variety of targets studied as part of contemporary social psychology, see Haslam (this volume) and Fiske (this volume). A special case of targets emerges from the study of selfdehumanization. After all, targets and perpetrators of dehumanization can dehumanize themselves in reaction to previous dehumanization. Targets do so as a reaction to being dehumanized by others and perpetrators do so in reaction to their own dehumanizing attitudes or actions toward others. Abbattista (this volume) discusses the complex bidirectional dynamics between perpetrator and target, including the metadehumanization and selfdehumanization of the latter in the historical contexts of exhibited humans. Demoulin et al. (this volume) present evidence from the psychologists’ labs and add that perpetrators sometimes dehumanize themselves in reaction to their own inhuman attitudes or actions. Following a long-standing tradition since Arendt’s account of evil, Frick (this volume) claims that those treating others in inhuman ways risk becoming inhuman themselves. If so, as Frick claims, this can have impacts on how we factor in ideas about restricted reciprocity, in particular when the content and scope of human rights is at issue.This is reminiscent of a quite old tradition in philosophy, as Meyers (2016) illustrates. Corrias (2016) shows how this echoes in legal categories and actual tribunals—for example, with respect to charges of crimes against humanity. An important issue in that respect is certainly whether we owe it to ourselves not to dehumanize the dehumanizer (see Corrias 2016 and Frick, this volume). In principle, the valence of dehumanization is neutral—it can be considered something good or bad to be less (than) human. After all, in a negative anthropology, being human is not considered something particularly good. Consistent with that, recent work in social psych­ ology tries to keep dehumanization distinct from dislike or outgroup biases (see Haslam, this volume, for review).This fits the results that differential attribution of properties deemed to be the insignia of humanity can be quite perspectival, as Paladino et al. (2009: 237) have shown. In a series of experiments, they show that ‘ours is human’—that is, what the participants attribute to the ingroup is what it means for them to be human, independent of the valence of these characteristics. Yet, the majority of the historical cases discussed in the literature seem to be cases where the valence is clearly on the negative side: to be human is taken to be good and protected (in the agent’s perspective and/or the scholar’s metaperspective) or at least the best status avail­ able on planet earth, whereas being less human, subhuman, and also superhuman means negative rhetoric or attitudes if not negative treatment by the dehumanizer. This does not exclude that there can be a valence ambiguity involved. As Heinämaa and Jardine (this volume) show, de Beauvoir (1949) already recognized that men might well idealize women as part of inferiorizing and subordinating them as less human. Fiske (Glick and Fiske 1996, this volume) shows, as part of her stereotype content model, how such a form of dehuman­ ization involves pity, an ambivalent emotion that relates to the ascription of low competence and 10 BK-TandF-KRONFELDNER_9781138588158-200119-Chp01.indd 10 18/12/20 12:04 PM Introduction high warmth. Smith (this volume) discusses such a valence ambiguity with a focus on intergroup prejudice and hatred (e.g., anti-Semitism). Superhumanization, he claims, often occurs if the respective other is perceived as dangerous; it can be theorized, as he claims, as perceiving the other as a monster.28 The above-mentioned contrast between demons and humans relates to this. Frick (this volume) also discusses the intricate dynamics of deification and demonization as forms of superhumanization, with respect to hierarchies in religious cults or sects,‘true’ believers versus infidels, or witchcraft beliefs. The discussion above also shows that dehumanization often has an emotional side, on both the perpetrator’s and the target’s ends.Which emotion that is depends on the form of dehumaniza­ tion, as Fiske’s stereotype content model shows. Already Strawson (1962: 190–195), for instance, claimed that a “human relationship” involves a “reactive attitude” (i.e., an attitude that reacts to the actions of the other as a member of a moral community). Reactive attitudes, according to Strawson, correlate with specific emotions, such as resentment, gratitude, forgiveness, and love. These emotions are missing if there is, instead, a dehumanizing “objective attitude,” which also has a potpourri of emotions attached, just different ones – for example, pity, fear, repulsion, dis­ gust, and certain forms of paternalistic care. The objective attitude can, however, also lead to indifference, a fact that contradicts the widespread assumption that emotions like hatred and disgust are defining elements of dehumanization. Bernard et al. (1971) already tried to correct this one-sidedness in the literature on dehumanization by stressing the importance of apathy and indifference in contemporary forms of dehumanization.This also raises the question of how dehumanization and hatred connect, if we take the latter as an emotion that is based on a reactive attitude.29 As Brudholm and Lang (this volume) show, the connection is far from straightfor­ ward. There can be both dehumanization without hatred (e.g., in cases of atrocities that are characterized by sheer indifference) and hatred without dehumanization (e.g., when violence involves a reactive attitude toward the target and should thus not be counted as dehumanizing). 1.4 Causes, functions, and consequences of dehumanization, and prospects for rehumanization The causes of dehumanization are still under study. Stereotypes are among the much-discussed causes, often with a respective emotional signature attached, if not caused themselves by emotions. Stereotypes also connect to the varieties of social structures and relations mentioned earlier— power, hierarchies, status, interdependence, and exclusion. Thus, social structures, relations, and situations are clearly relevant, either as further independent causes or as causes of the indi­ vidual stereotypes, emotions, or social attitudes, such as social dominance orientation, nationalist orientations, and so on. Individual difference variables (i.e., whether a person is disgust prone, or narcissistic, etc.) need to be factored in, as Haslam (this volume) reminds us.As with many social issues, it holds that the causal story underlying cases of dehumanization will be quite complex. That is, it will involve many causes, feedbacks, and the like. Thus, any search for a monocausal, unidirectional, and simple ‘one-cause-fits-all’ causal structure is doomed to fail. The functions of dehumanization vary too. Prominent are the explanatory and justificatory functions with respect to harm: dehumanization is one of the causes of the inhuman and/or a post hoc perceived justification and thus perceived license to the inhuman. In other words, dehuman­ ization often enables people to overcome an inhibition to harm or kill, or it is taken by people to justify the harming and killing – and be it after the fact. There are other functions that will fit less violent forms of dehumanization. Projection is one; and according to de Beauvoir (1949) and Nussbaum (2006, 2013), it is not ultimately grounded in a need to overcome inhibitions to harm or kill, but rather in a need to overcome the anxieties related to one’s very own mortality 11 BK-TandF-KRONFELDNER_9781138588158-200119-Chp01.indd 11 18/12/20 12:04 PM Maria Kronfeldner and bodily existence. Heinämaa and Jardine (this volume) provide us with a philosophical take on that facet of dehumanization. In psychology, it is known as terror management.30 Esses et al. (this volume) discuss still another function – namely, the function of defending a social status quo (e.g. with respect to excluding refugees, asylum seekers, and immigrants).That function can connect to still further functions. Dehumanization is used, for instance, for upholding a specific identity. Those with a cosmopolitan identity, for instance, can dehumanize others, despite well-meaning universalist attitudes.They do so in reaction to their own passivity regarding the suffering of war victims, refugees, asylum seekers, poor people, drug addicts, and other socially ‘distant’ people. They can prevent thereby nagging guilt feelings or emotional discomfort (see Esses et al., this volume). A more general but related function is what Bernard et al. (1971) called ego defense, a mechanism that prevents otherwise painful or overwhelming emotions and contradictory selfimages. Last but not least: dehumanization serves submission and exploitation. These functions also relate to our emotions regarding those social robots that look and behave uncannily similar to humans (see Paladino et al., this volume). Being afraid of the humanization of a robot is not a case of dehumanization of a human being, but it is its mirror image. For instance, the hope of some, to replace certain forms of exploitation of humans (e.g., in sex work, care work, or other exploitative work) by using social robots instead, might be doomed to fail.Widespread humanrobot replacements might be a spurious victory over dehumanization since these replacements might well deepen the hierarchies that cause dehumanization, jeopardizing human sociality as such (i.e., as we know it, based on principles of reciprocity and equality). That technology can lead to the dehumanization of the overall species is a claim (or fear) that already concerned Montagu and Matson (1983), as Milam (this volume) mentions. Paladino et al. (this volume) dis­ cuss how to explain (at the level of perceptual and cognitive processing) the fears that relate to the humanization of robots and its potential mirror image, the increased dehumanization of humans. The negative consequences of dehumanization range from sheer indifference, lack of kindness, subtle discriminations, deliberate rudeness, hierarchical domination, exploitation, oppression within a society, to social death and outright social or moral exclusion from a society. A variety of injustices, harms, and atrocities result from these. For review of empirical studies on the variety of specific consequences, see Haslam (this volume). Haslam also reviews work that shows that the effects of dehumanization can extend backwards, blocking forgiveness and the willingness of perpetrators to take responsibility for past atrocities. Actual (rather than imagined) behavioral consequences of dehumanization have not been studied much in experimental settings, because of obvious methodological difficulties that stem in part from ethical limits of psychological research. But there are some endeavors in that direction. Esses et al. (this volume) review them. They also mention an important point about behavioral consequences: dehumanizing attitudes that are implicit are unlikely to have consequences at the level of verbal behavior. They will, rather, show their ‘ugly face’ in nonverbal behavior that is often less (norm-)controlled by the subjects. Implicit forms of dehumanization are therefore sometimes the more dangerous ones since they are harder to influence. As with the causes, it is important to note that connections between the different consequences can be complex. For instance, hierarchical domination, social death, and moral exclusion should not be understood as unconnected or alternative consequences of dehumanization.The former, the hierarchical domination within a society, theorized by Hund (2010, this volume) as societalization by dehumanization, can thrive on the latter—the social death or exclusion of still others, leading to a vicious social spiraling of societalization (inclusion) and desocietalization (exclusion) by dehumanization. Finally, the prospects of reducing dehumanization or undoing it (rehumanization) in discourses, attitudes, and acts can vary, depending on background assumptions and contexts. 12 BK-TandF-KRONFELDNER_9781138588158-200119-Chp01.indd 12 18/12/20 12:04 PM Introduction If there is an innate ‘like us’ detector grounding dehumanization, as Wilson (this volume) and Smith (this volume) mention, or an innate animacy detector (Varga, this volume), then the prospects might be slim. But it might as well be that assuming such an evolved, innate mech­ anism grounding dehumanizing is itself a historically and culturally contingent way of looking at dehumanization—a metaessentialist move that can be overcome, as dehumanization itself can be overcome, to a certain degree at least or maybe fully. As Fiske (this volume) notes, even a neuro­ logical signature of dehumanization is no sign of inevitability.31 Dehumanization can thus also be conceptualized as part of a cognitively, historically, culturally, and socially contingent reasoning process that is quite malleable. Thus, if the respective attitudes can be adapted, the prospects might lighten up a bit at least and the pathways of securing the human will gain some contours. Abbattista (this volume), for instance, discusses how those being exhibited as part of ethnic shows (re-)gained (some) agency, despite economic dependency. Recent histories of German violence during the Nazi era also show that some targets managed to rehumanize themselves.As Leydesdorff (2017) illustrated with her history of the revolt and mass escape of inmates from the Nazi death camp Sobibor in Poland, those escaping, led by the Russian Jew Aleksandr Pechersky, did clearly not behave like ‘sheep being led to the slaughter.’ That animalistic metaphor for pas­ sivity in face of violence is part of an anti-Semitic stereotype that gained unfortunate prevalence in parts of the Holocaust literature and public discourse, leading to a myth of Jewish passivity. By wrongly portraying targets of dehumanization as merely passive victims, scholars can contribute to a culture of memory and to ways of telling the history of inhumanity that reiterates what it meant to study in an objective manner, contributing to cycles of metadehumanization and selfdehumanization. It is thus of utmost importance to analyze the latter, as Demoulin et al. (this volume) do—in their case, from the psychologist’s point of view. Demoulin et al. (this volume) add that as long as the antecedents of metadehumanization and selfdehumanization are not totalitarian, systemic, and enduring, the individual might find a way out. Such antecedents can consist in detrimental cultures of memory in the case of atrocities, abu­ sive work relations that lead to mechanistic selfdehumanization in the case of industrialized cap­ italist societies, and the like.What the individual has to find is not only a way out of incorporating the myth of passivity or abusive structures into the subject’s self-model (selfdehumanization), but also a way out of the dehumanizing conditions themselves. In other contexts and at other levels, further options for rehumanization will be pertinent. Esses et al. (this volume), in part based on Gaucher et al. (2018), discuss empirical evidence on how governments can positively influence the rehumanization of refugees—for example, by utilizing the so-called system justification motivation. Esses et al. offer the example of how the newly elected Canadian government, in 2015, managed to positively sanction the humanization of refugees. As a result, the minds of the citizens followed, to a considerable degree at least. Esses et al. (this volume) also discuss that a more individualized portrayal of the dehumanized targets (e.g., in the media) can have positive effects. Whether and how literary works can help in rehumanization (or preventing dehumanization) is discussed in a quite crossdisciplinary manner. Hunt (2007) has claimed that works generating narrative empathy with dehumanized others historically contributed to the emergence of the idea of universal human rights (compare Slaughter 2007). Philosophers like Nussbaum (1995b) and Rorty (1998) also stressed the rehumanizing potential of literature. Experimental work also aims to provide evidence for answering the question (e.g., as reported in Kidd and Castano 2013). Prinz (2011) or Bloom (2018) argue that lack of empathy—understood as an emotion— is neither always the right diagnosis of cases of inhumanity nor is more empathy always the best cure. Far from being “the magic bullet of morality,” as Bloom (2018: 33) writes, empathy is often ineffective in beating inhumanity, and frequently even adds to it or is the source of it. 13 BK-TandF-KRONFELDNER_9781138588158-200119-Chp01.indd 13 18/12/20 12:04 PM Maria Kronfeldner Blum (2018), by contrast, understands empathy as a recognitional attitude and comes therefore to a different conclusion.Timár (2015, 2019, this volume) discusses different meanings and effects of empathy, sympathy, and the like on dehumanization, from the perspective of literary scholarship. Crary (this volume) claims that overcoming widespread beliefs about human superiority can con­ tribute to limiting dehumanization. She also claims that the neutral stance regarding the human in many contemporary accounts of moral and political philosophy will not be helpful in that respect. Finally, there are methods of legal rehumanization, as Corrias (2016, this volume) shows. 1.5 Theoretical complexities In this section, a set of theoretical complexities shall be highlighted. The first stems from the fact that one can study dehumanization from different actors’ perspectives. One can study it with respect to the dehumanizer’s perspective (used for instance in perpetrator studies), but also with respect to the target’s perspective, the perspective of the dehumanized. That the two can fall apart becomes clear if we imagine a case of dehumanization where the dehumanization goes completely unnoticed by the target. Mikkola (this volume) discusses such a case, with reference to a thought experiment from Gardner and Shute’s (2000) account of rape. So far, most works have been analyzing the first perspective, that of the dehumanizer, which is why Demoulin et al. (this volume) set a decisive focus on the targets’ metadehumanization (awareness that they are dehumanized) and selfdehumanization. It is important to keep metadehumanization and selfdehumanization distinct, since the latter can happen without the first (e.g., in the case of perpetrators). In such a case, selfdehumanization is a reaction to one’s own immoral behavior, as Demoulin et al. (this volume) show. The target and the perpetrator are the same person. If it is two persons involved, downward spirals of violence can result, with self- and otherrelated dehumanization interacting. Brudholm and Lang (this volume) thus try to involve both perspectives in order to arrive at a balanced picture, in their case with respect to the question of how hatred and dehumanization relate. Heinämaa and Jardine (this volume) stress that dehu­ manization is an interactive process between the perpetrator, target, and others, often involving a selfdehumanization on the side of the target that can be embodied, leading to what they call epidermalization. Literary work has, evidently, a special sensitivity regarding such dynamic com­ plexities, and analyzes the respective narrative structures (see Timár 2019, this volume). Another important metalevel issue relates to the appropriate specificity of a description or explanation. An example can illustrate why keeping that issue in mind is important. The atrocities of the National Socialists against Jewish people and other groups are often taken as paradigmatic cases of dehumanization.The National Socialists regarded and treated their targets as less human if not less than human. Yet, irrespective of all the historical, philosophical, and sociological debates about how to properly account for the Holocaust and other atrocities of the National Socialists, it is clear that the Nazi hatred against Jewish people was based (not only but also) on anti-Semitism. The latter can rest on quite different anthropological theories (as Steizinger, this volume, shows) and also on different concepts of race or volk (as Hund, this volume, mentions). In any case, it is clear that the hatred against Jewish people during the Holocaust was specifically against Jewish people as Jewish people. If so, then it seems that Jewish people were humiliated, tortured, and killed because they were regarded as Jews, as, for instance, Améry (1978) already stressed (see, Kravitz, 2019). Anti-Semitism would be the more specific description and explanation of the atrocities, at least compared to dehumanization. The latter would amount to describing and explaining the atrocities as having happened because Jews were not regarded as humans. Since more specific descriptions and explanations are usually taken as better descriptions and explanations, it would miss the point to quote dehumanization as the 14 BK-TandF-KRONFELDNER_9781138588158-200119-Chp01.indd 14 18/12/20 12:04 PM Introduction description and explanation of the atrocities that Jewish people had to face. It would be referring to a quite general cause of the wrongdoing involved even though a more specific and precise explanation is available. Yet, this only looks at one side of the matter, it seems. If a human being is recognized only as Jewish—rather than as Jewish and human—then the bond, the reciprocity, the recognitional attitudes (like solidarity, respect, and empathy) operative as part of humanism are likely to be undone more easily. And this is why it might well be that referring to dehumanization is doing some explanatory work, be it in the case of the Holocaust or other instances of inhumanity. Rorty (1998) can be interpreted as giving such a reply when he claims that—during the Bosnian War—Serbian soldiers killed and tortured Muslims because they regarded them as Muslims rather than as humans. So, dehumanization means: not recognizing the respective other as also human. Anti-Semitism and other specific forms of group-based enmity can thus involve dehumaniza­ tion, even though they can never be reduced to dehumanization since they are more specific. Overempha…

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